EU Fraud: institutional and legal competence by Quirke, Brendan J.
www.ssoar.info
EU Fraud: institutional and legal competence
Quirke, Brendan J.
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Quirke, B. J. (2009). EU Fraud: institutional and legal competence. Crime, Law and Social Change, 51(5), 531-547.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-008-9183-8
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-203862
EU Fraud: institutional and legal competence
Brendan J Quirke
Published online: 3 March 2009
# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2009
Abstract This paper will focus on frauds committed against the budget of the
European Union. It will consider the role of OLAF (the European Fraud Prevention
Office) which is the lead agency in the fight against fraud. It will consider its powers
and its capacity to co-ordinate the activities of anti-fraud agencies in twenty seven
member states and the constraints which prevent it from operating in a more
effective manner. The paper will also consider the role of other transnational bodies
such as Eurojust and Europol and will seek to highlight the degree of fragmentation
which exists with a multiplicity of actors involved in policing fraud, a fragmented
legal approach and the difficulties this presents in policing sophisticated transna-
tional frauds. The effect of EU expansion on this situation will also be examined and
the EU anti-fraud efforts of the Czech Republic will be considered in some detail.
The paper concludes that the legal system and the institutions are not yet in place to
enable such frauds to be adequately policed.
Introduction
This paper will focus on a particular aspect of financial crime, namely fraud against
the budget of the European Union. The European Budget attracts both organised
economic criminals, or opportunistic entrepreneurs who resort to fraud a means of
supporting a failing enterprise or helping a company or organisation in financial
difficulties.
The research question to be considered here is whether a fragmented approach to
fighting EU fraud is an effective approach. Also, does OLAF, the European Fraud
Prevention Office, have the resources to co-ordinate the efforts of the many agencies
involved? The paper will also consider whether enlargement has complicated the
response to fraud and will look at the experience of the Czech Republic. Another
question to be considered, is whether there is a need for a form of legal code to deal
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with crimes against the budget. The methodology adopted for this study was to
undertake a review of secondary materials such as reports of the European
Commission, reports from the European Court of Auditors, reports from the UK
Parliament as well as academic articles. This was supplemented by a number of
semi-structured interviews undertaken with officials from the Supreme Prosecutors
Office in the Czech Republic—which is the body tasked with co-ordinating anti-
fraud efforts, as well as interviews with Czech academic experts.
An important point to note at the outset is that in the area of expenditure, Member
States carry out 80% of the budget outlay, both in the Common Agricultural Policy
and the Structural Funds. This puts an enormous amount of onus on Member States
to expend the same amount of effort on countering fraud against the Union’s
financial interests as they would against their own financial interests. Yet they have
no common definitions of what they regard as fraud. There is even a widespread
disparity in reporting practices concerning EU frauds between Member States [15].
There is a long held suspicion in Brussels that Member States fight fraud against
their own national budgets with more alacrity than fraud against the European
budget.1 It could be that Member states regard fraud as part of the membership fee of
belonging to this exclusive club. In cost benefit terms, it is a relatively minor cost
which is more than outweighed by the economic and political benefits of
membership. If this is the case then the fight against fraud is hampered from the
very start. This is despite the fact that national taxpayers contribute to this budget
and it is their money which is being stolen.
Under Article 280 of the Treaty on European Union, Member States are required
to take EU fraud as seriously as fraud against their own budgets and are required to
coordinate their action aimed at protecting the financial interests of the Union against
fraud and to organise with the help of the European Commission, close and regular
cooperation between the competent departments of their administrations. However,
this “co-operation is seriously weakened from the start, due to the aforementioned
differences in defining frauds and reporting them to the Brussels authorities.
The true extent of fraud has been considered by a number of authors such as Sherlock
& Harding [21], Passas & Nelkin [17], White [29], [30]; Sieber [22], [23]; Tutt [26]
who all comment on the lack of reliable information. Ruimschotel [20] makes the
observation that policymakers and politicians are likely to have mixed feelings about
the possibility of knowing more about the real extent of fraud. If figures revealed by
‘dark number’ research are higher than the existing figures, it could look that there has
been a boom in fraud, also, there is a bigger ‘target’ figure to claw back for the
taxpayer. This could show how efficient or otherwise a legal system is in terms of
recovering defrauded funds. This last point is recognised by OLAF officials2
In terms of the extent of fraud against the budget, this is very difficult to estimate,
given that fraudsters attempt to keep their activities secret as presumably, they do not
wish to be caught. In 2007, there were just over 6,000 irregularities reported to
OLAF by member state agencies. The financial impact of these irregularities is
estimated at just over one billion euros [7]. Irregularities in the structural and
1 Interview with OLAF Official 2005
2 Interview with OLAF Officals 2005
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cohesion funds amounted to just under 50% of the number reported overall, but over
80% of the estimated financial impact, some 828 million euros. Whereas agricultural
irregularities in the EAGGF Guarantee part of the budget, whilst consisting of a
similar number to the structural funds ones, have a far lower financial impact, some
155 million euros. In one sense this is no great surprise. The system for payments to
farmers has been heavily reformed and this appears to be bearing fruit. Structural
Funds is a growing area of the budget—towards 40%—one would expect the
number of reported irregularities to be a significant proportion of all irregularities
communicated to Brussels. Herein lies a problem, the reporting system identifies
irregularities not frauds. Some irregularities may be as simple as a farmer not filling
in a claim form properly, others could be major transnational frauds. Structural
Funds frauds such as over-invoicing, submitting claims for expenditure which is
disallowed under the regulations, corruptly administering the tendering process for
contracts, not completing the work that funding is claimed for, all feature in the
frauds and irregularities reported. Despite the declarations about the priority of
combating fraud, the fact that most of the budget is administered/managed at
national level and very often EU money is not seen as “our money”, there appears to
be an unwillingness to take the necessary initiatives to deal specifically with fraud
involving EU funds [14]. Murawska [14] goes on to make the point that: ‘The whole
EC anti-fraud system is branded by inefficiency, lax scrutiny, lack of transparency
and flood of complicated and complex legal norms which stimulate and encourage
the perpetrators to commit fraud. Fraudsters often avoid criminal responsibility, they
are well organised, use modern technologies and misuse the greatest achievement of
the EU—the Common Market and its freedoms’ [14].
The question now can be asked as to who has legal competence to investigate and
prosecute these types of fraud?
The European Fraud Prevention Office (OLAF)
OLAF (The European Fraud Prevention Office), is the lead transnational institution
in the fight against EU fraud. OLAF came into being as a result of a
recommendation from the then European Commission President, Jacques Santer,
in 1998. This recommendation was prompted by a critical report from the European
Court of Auditors [2] on the performance of UCLAF—the European Commission’s
Anti-Fraud unit and the predecessor to OLAF. The Court of Auditors Report whilst
commending UCLAF for the good work it had achieved, did make some serious
criticisms of the way it handled intelligence, managed case files and maintained
security. Levy [13], did make the point that giving UCLAF ‘hands-on’ powers,
could prove counter-productive from the point of view of partnership with Member
States—duplication of effort, lack of detailed procedural knowledge and so on.
These criticisms were bolstered by a report from the European Parliament (the Bosch
Report), which called for an independent fraud prevention office. Damning evidence
had been gathered of the complete inability of the Commission to adequately
perform its duties which led to the employment of external contractors which were
subject to hardly any financial or management control, inevitably frauds resulted
[27].
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The Commission’s proposal was for an anti-fraud office that would be based
outside of the Commission and would have complete independence from it. It was
presented to the Vienna European Council in December 1998. In response to the
reactions of the European Parliament and the Council, an amended proposal for a
Regulation: ‘concerning investigations conducted by the Fraud Prevention Office’,
was adopted by the Commission in March 1999. The new body took over certain
functions that had previously been exercised by UCLAF. The proposal did not
involve the creation of any new powers for the Commission. Nor did it involve the
creation of a body with its own legal personality, although the Office was given, in
theory at least, operational independence and was also given its own budget. The
mission of OLAF is to protect the financial interests of the European Union and to
fight fraud, corruption and other illegal activity having financial consequences for
the Union or its funds. OLAF carries out investigations into allegations of fraud and
other illegality both within the Union’s institutions (internal investigations) and
within individual Member States (external investigations). It passes on its findings to
the institution in question or to the national prosecution authority of the Member
State, in question, or to both as the case may be. OLAF has no power to prosecute
[11].
The Powers of OLAF
Much of OLAF’s powers are based upon a decision adopted in July 1998 on the
conduct of its predecessor UCLAF’s enquiries, by the European Commission. This
decision, as noted by the Committee of Experts [1] who were appointed by the
European Parliament to conduct an enquiry into fraud and corruption within the
Commission after the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999, is essentially
concerned with regulating the conduct of inquiries within the Commission and/or the
mutual obligations of UCLAF and other Commission services in relation to
investigations.
The principal powers and competences of OLAF are as follows:
& OLAF is empowered to carry out administrative enquiries, without notice, within
all the institutions and other bodies of the European Union. These are known as
internal investigations. Inquiries may involve members and staff of the
institutions
& All institutions and other bodies are placed under a corresponding obligation
fully to co-operate in OLAF enquiries and to communicate to OLAF any
information concerning possible fraud.
& OLAF also has the right under Regulation 2185/96 to undertake “on the spot”
investigations in member states, where OLAF has the right to arrive in a member
state—unannounced if need be and request the assistance of member state
authorities in any investigation.
In terms of how it exercised its powers of internal investigation within the
institutions of the EU, OLAF has been criticised as a result of what is known as the
Eurostat case. Here, there were irregularities which took place in the European
Statistical Office involving the payment of receipts from the sale of Eurostat
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publications into a suspect bank account. OLAF has been criticised for the amount
of time taken by it to investigate the case and the Commission’s lack of knowledge
of the alleged irregularities that were under investigation. In response to these
criticisms, the Commission proposed a number of amendments to Regulation 1073/
99 which is one of the Regulations governing OLAF. The Commission’s proposals
have four objectives:
& to strengthen OLAF’s operational efficiency
& to improve the information flow between OLAF and EU institutions and bodies
& to ensure fully the rights of the individuals under investigation
& to enhance the role of the Supervisory Committee
In order to achieve these objectives, the proposed Regulation:
& prevents EU institutions and bodies from conducting their own internal
administrative investigations on matters under investigation by OLAF (amended
Article 1(3);
& clarifies OLAF’s powers to conduct external investigations ( amended Article 3
(2);
& enables OLAF in the conduct of external investigations to have direct access to
information held by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies relevant to those
investigations (amended Article 3(3);
& requires OLAF, on undertaking an investigation involving a member of an EU
institution, immediately to inform the EU institution of the investigation (new
Article 6 (5a));
& establishes procedures to ensure the fundamental rights (“procedural guaran-
tees”) of individuals being investigated (new Article 7a)
& strengthens the role of the Supervisory Committee by increasing its membership
from five to seven (one of whom would monitor the observance by OLAF of the
rights of individuals) and entrusting it with the task of delivering opinions
concerning procedural guarantees (amended Article 11) [12].
The original reform has been further amended by the Commission tabling a new
proposal which takes into account proposals from the European Parliament and the
Council of Ministers to further evaluate the performance of OLAF (EuCrim [4], p.6).
The new proposal includes two major changes to the original one which reflects the
view of Commission Vice-President Kallas that OLAF’s investigations need political
governance as well as an independent review of proceedings while ensuring the
confidentiality of investigations (EuCrim [4], 1/2). The major changes are:
& The Supervisory Committee is to get more political functions. It is proposed that
there should be regular meetings between the Supervisory Committee and
representatives of the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the
Commission. The main aim is to exercise political control over OLAF’s
investigations and its efficiency, by discussing the definition of the Office’s
strategic priorities as well as the reports on its work programme and activities.
& The establishment of an independent ‘Review Adviser’ is also suggested. The
rationale behind the creation of such a post is that the Review Adviser would
have an oversight function in respect of procedural rights. He/she would receive
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and scrutinise complaints from persons under investigation at all stages of an
inquiry. He/she would also have the function of giving opinions, for example, if
the OLAF Director wished to extend an investigation beyond twelve months or if
the Director wished to postpone the obligation to hear the person under
investigation (EuCrim [4], 1/2).
These proposals have been subjected to a number of observations and criticisms.:
The length of time taken to amend OLAF’s powers
The attempt to amend OLAF’s powers has been going on since 2003. This has led to
great uncertainty and is not conducive to promoting good morale amongst the staff
of the Office. It is urgently required that such uncertainty be removed as quickly as
possible. Five years is far too long a period for this to continue and for the Office
and its staff to endure.
OLAF’s requirement to inform Institutions it is investigating them
Professor Levi and Dr Dorn in their evidence to the House of Lords European
Committee, argued that the requirement to inform the institution that it was under
investigation could well lead to the investigation being compromised [11]. This
could lead to the investigation being blocked and obstructed and of course evidence
could be covered up or even destroyed. Levi and Dorn (2004) argue that: ‘The
Commission will argue that it (and other Institutions) need to know at the earliest
opportunity that the integrity of an individual and project may be compromised, so
that it can take remedial steps. Yet those steps are precisely what would undermine
the secrecy needed to initiate cases, investigate and gain evidence of wrong-doing’
[12], p.6). Raymond Kendall of OLAF’s Supevisory Board, took the view that rules
could not be made about an issue like this- it should be at the discretion of the
investigator. It appears that the Commission is not prepared to give OLAF full
discretion to decide whether or not to inform the Commission [11]. This
compromises the independence of OLAF and is ill-advised. OLAF when it was
established, was in theory given full operational independence, even though it
remained part of the Commission, this has been badly dented by the proposals
advanced by the Commission. OLAF will have ‘one arm tied behind its back’, in the
fight against fraud.
Powers of Inspection
There were concerns expressed by the UK Government that the amendments
proposed in Articles 3 (2) and three might have the effect of extending the
investigative powers of OLAF. They proposed to seek assurances that Article 3 does
not imply that the ability and right of national agencies to conduct investigations
within a Member State could be impaired by OLAF wielding their powers under the
Article. The House of Lords agreed with this view and stressed the importance of
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both OLAF and national agencies being able to work in harmony without frustrating
the efforts of each other [12]. This is an important point, because liaison between
agencies investigating the same case is crucial as evidence gathering could be
compromised if national rules and regulations are not followed, also there could be
duplication of effort and resources and there could also be credibility problems if
representatives from different agencies visit the same locations, question the same
people asking the same questions. This is illustrated by the competition which
existed between the then anti-fraud office of the Commission — UCLAF and
another Commission department DGXX- the Financial Control Directorate, in the
late 1990’s and the harm that was done to the investigation of fraud within the
Commission itself. Rivalry and competition ensues, resources and effort was
duplicated, files were ‘lost’- fragmentation occurred. If this can happen within the
Commission, then the scope for fragmentation is all the greater with a European
Union of twenty seven members and all the different agencies inherent in such an
organisation. Even now officials from the Czech Republic have commented that they
get asked for exactly the same information by both OLAF and the European
Commission which leads to an obvious duplication of effort3.
Given the inherent risks outlined above, the question can be asked: should OLAF
be involved in external investigative work? Stefanou & Xanthaki [24] emphasise the
investigative function of OLAF and observe that the results from OLAF
investigations can be used in criminal proceedings and can serve as the preparatory
phase for prosecutions in national courts. In order to promote and carry out this
function at the national level, OLAF has sought to establish co-operation agreements
with national investigative bodies such as with police bodies and also in the
framework of the OLAF Anti-Fraud Communication network for exchange of
information on EU-related fraud. According to Stefanou & Xanthaki [24], the main
objective of OLAF’s involvement in the investigations which take place at the
national level, is to increase their effectiveness and efficiency and to enhance the
level of protection of the EU’s financial interests. They observe that this is achieved
by:
& involvement of OLAF in the investigation;
& provision by OLAF of training and methodological support;
& OLAF’s contribution in promoting co-operation between various investigative
and legal authorities in different Member States. This is extremely important as
EU fraud often has a transnational dimension and can fall under the jurisdiction
of two or more Member States.
OLAF has a European wide view which no national agency could have. If a
transnational approach is deemed to be not viable, how could national agencies
assume this role? How could they have the multinational expertise, knowledge of
culture and national procedures, linguistic ability and so on. It is not to overstate the
case to say that strengthening OLAF and the tools it has at its disposal is the only
game in town! OLAF collects data on irregularities with a value of more than 10,000
euros ( this has been raised from 4,000) and liaises with national agencies across
twenty seven member states. Its staff have a wide range of expertise from police
3 Interview with Czech Officials 2006
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backgrounds, judicial, audit and accountancy, agricultural inspection, customs and so
on.
Yet, OLAF’s involvement in external investigations has been questioned. The UK
House of Lords takes the view that OLAF’s external investigative work has been
limited, yet they offer no evidence to support this particular assertion. They do quote
from a 2003 Report by OLAF’s Supervisory Committee which makes the point that
OLAF’s intervention tends to occur long after the event and that there have been
problems with national courts accepting evidence collected by OLAF. ‘National
courts have wanted evidence to be collected in accordance with their own national
procedures’ [11], p.8). This has led to the suggestion made by Professor Levi and Dr
Dorn in their evidence to the House of Lords European Committee, that external
investigations should be carried by the Commission through its Directorates-General
working with Member States. They argue that if OLAF were to give up external
cases (except those having an internal aspect — relevant to the EU institutions), then
all of OLAF’s resources could be brought to bear against internal fraud and
corruption. There is a clear logic to this, yet in order to achieve this aim, it would be
necessary to re-establish anti-fraud units in relevant DG’s (they were taken out of
DG’s and combined with UCLAF in the 1990’s), might this not lead to a duplication
of resources? Also, many external cases could have have internal dimensions or
could force internal investigations which OLAF would undertake anyway.
A variation on the above proposal would be to rely on Member States to carry out
investigations on their territories leaving OLAF free to concentrate on purely internal
cases. Stefanou & Xanthaki [24] believe that following the principle of subsidiarity.
Member States in their view, had primary responsibility for external investigations
and should take responsibility for opening cases. The fact is that 80% of expenditure
occurs at Member State level, therefore fraud is likely to be more prevalent at
Member State level, so inevitably Member State agencies are going to be heavily
involved in investigation. Yet, as many frauds do have a cross-border or
transnational dimension, it would not be possible for Member State agencies to
have the European wide view which OLAF has, and the ability to facilitate co-
operation and co-ordination across national boundaries.
Independence of OLAF
Other issues to be considered include: the independence of OLAF which inevitably
impacts upon its operational capability. OLAF despite the concerns expressed about
is predecessor, UCLAF, is still like UCLAF, part of the Commission. The greater
part of its work is still attributed to the Commission. Its Director is appointed by the
Council and Parliament, but from a shortlist which is drawn up by the Commission.
This therefore, gives the Commission a great deal of potential influence over: ‘who
gets the job’. Where is the oversight to ensure that the shortlist has been drawn
fairly? Which agency has this role? The position does not appear to be very clear.
The Committee of Experts [1], took the view that it was useful for OLAF to be
‘inside’ the Commission, both for the purpose of its enquiries as well as for the
contribution it could make to the shaping of legislation where there is a fraud interest
or dimension. The fact that OLAF is still part of the Commission gives it an
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opportunity to play a part in ‘fraud proofing’ legislation at the early draft stages.
However, where OLAF investigates allegations of fraud inside the Commission - so
called ‘internal investigations’, it is surely a case of the Commission investigating
itself. This cannot be right. It has the potential to compromise independence. If
OLAF had been placed outside the Commission, then it could still have had an
“arms-length” input into the process of formulating legislation, through some kind of
advisory committee for example.
It is true to say that there has been a genuine attempt to secure and strengthen the
independence of OLAF by giving it a separate budget apart from that of the
Commission as a whole and by trying to ensure that the appointment of a Director is
achieved without undue influence by any of the interested parties such as the
Commission, Parliament or the Council of Ministers. This has been undermined to
some extent by allowing the Commission a role in drawing up the shortlist of
suitable candidates. There has been an attempt to establish legal guarantees to
safeguard OLAF’s independence which can be found in Articles 11 and 12 of
Regulation (EC) No. 1073/99 which declare the independence of the Director and
establish a Supervisory Committee which endeavours to oversee OLAF’s inves-
tigations without interfering in them.
Notwithstanding these attempts to safeguard OLAF’s independence, its current
hybrid status where it is part of the Commission yet independent of it does mean as
Stefanou & Xanthaki [24] recognise that its activities are still subject to evaluation
by the Commission, it is unable to report to the European Parliament on its own
legal grounds but as part of the executive (the Commission), does mean that its
independence could be seen to be compromised.
Pujas [18] believes that OLAF’s legitimacy is regularly questioned by national
and European institutions because of its semi-autonomous state and the lack of
guarantees regarding the objectivity and transparency of its investigations.
Another area where OLAF’s independence could be seen to be compromised and
which bears directly on its ability to investigate fraud is in the area of staff recruitment.
Given the diversity of functions which OLAF is required to perform: its investigations
can be administrative, disciplinary, financial, tax, customs based then this can make
recruitment a difficult problem. A balance must be struck between the different
categories of investigators such as those who deal with EAGGF frauds, frauds against
the structural funds, frauds upon income such as own resources and functions which are
‘up-stream’ of investigations such as intelligence or administration. In order to recruit
staff to meet all these diverse needs, then this could be quite difficult. The preoccupation
with nationality balance in recruitment and maintenance of the staff establishment can
potentially mean that good staff are lost and less able staff are appointed. With each
enlargement of the European Union, priority is given to nationals from new member
states in the recruitment process. Given that the Union has very recently expanded from
fifteen to twenty seven members, then this is likely to have a huge impact on recruitment
and selection. New staff, by definition, lack experience in transnational work, and also
perhaps lack detailed knowledge of complex programme areas such as the Common
Agricultural Policy and Structural Funds.
The European Court of Auditors in their recent report evaluating the performance
of OLAF [3] made this very point. The Court found that over 55% of staff in
categories A & B—over 130 posts were employed on temporary contracts. Most of
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these temporary contracts will come to an end between 2007 and 2009 when the
staff concerned will have to leave the Office [3]. There is a high risk that all this
accumulated knowledge and experience will disappear when staff are required to
leave. This problem is exacerbated when, with each enlargement of the EU, priority
in recruitment and selection has to be given to staff from new Member States, who
because of their inexperience in transnational work, will face a steep learning curve.
The net effect of this is to provide the potential for disruption to quite complex
investigations. There is a need for OLAF to be given more freedom for manoeuvre
in its recruitment and selection procedures so that it can provide its investigators
with more stable employment and career opportunities which will impact upon the
quality of its investigative function. There is the potential for significant harm to be
done to OLAF’s reputation by having high staff turnover and a significant proportion
of staff being inexperienced. These are self-inflicted wounds and need to be
addressed.
Role of Eurojust and Europol
The role of Eurojust according to the constitutional treaty is to ‘support and
strengthen coordination and cooperation between national investigating and
prosecuting authorities in relation to serious crime affecting two or more Member
States, or requiring a prosecution on common bases, on the basis of operations
conducted and information supplied by the Member States’ authorities and by
Europol’ (Article III-273 (1)). Eurojust is made up of national prosecutors and by
magistrates or police officers from each Member State and its objective is to
facilitate co-operation between the national prosecuting authorities and to improve
the co-ordination of criminal investigations and information exchange. Eurojust
operates within the third pillar of the European Union. This is reflected in its
membership which consists of one national member seconded from each Member
State. Eurojust is directly accountable to the Council of Ministers to which it reports
on a regular basis. The Commission has no influence on Eurojust’s operations and
decisions. In a formal sense, yet it does propose its budget and in 2004, did not meet
Eurojust’s request for an increased budget of 11.5 million euros—the Commission
reduced it to 9.3 million euros [12], p.14). This of course could well have impacted
on Eurojust’s operations.
It would appear that there is ample opportunity for OLAF and Eurojust to co-
operate. OLAF on the investigation side, where it conducts administrative
investigations and Eurojust providing the link with national prosecutors. However,
there have been difficulties. Eurojust in its evidence to the House of Lords believed
that OLAF saw it as a competitor. There were instances of OLAF liaising directly
with national judicial authorities and not informing Eurojust and also setting up a
Magistrates Unit within OLAF in competition with Eurojust [11]. In defence of
OLAF it can be said that its Magistrates Unit is totally dedicated to fighting EU
fraud whereas for Eurojust, fraud is just another issue and may not rank as highly as
terrorism and organised crime.4 There was a feeling of resentment — OLAF
4 Interview with OLAF Officials 2005
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considered Eurojust responsible for there not being a European Prosecutor on fraud
[12], p.27). Eurojust took the view that OLAF believed it had no role to play in fraud
investigation unless other serious crimes were linked to fraud. Such ‘territoriality’ is
not conducive to fighting fraud effectively and could inevitably lead to duplication
and waste of resources. The two bodies have now signed a Memorandum of
Understanding which specifies in which they undertake to cooperate in areas of
mutual concern/benefit. There is potential here to develop the relationship and also
to give OLAF some judicial authority which it has not had so far Stefanou &
Xanthaki [24]. Eurojust believes that it is ideally placed to co-operate with OLAF in
addressing its concerns that its investigations are not followed up be prosecutions in
Member States [11].
In terms of Europol, its role in the fight against EU fraud has not really been
developed. In its 2004 report, there is barely a mention of the role it believes it can
play. The report does mention OLAF and the agreement between both parties, but
does not include any practical examples of co-operation between the two bodies [8].
OLAF takes the view that Europol is far more interested in Customs issues than
wider EU Fraud matters5 In the late 1990’s there was a view in the Commission that
‘Europol is not really interested in fraud. It is more interested in drugs and
terrorism’6. Europol does not have the investigative powers that OLAF has, it is
more of an intelligence gathering organisation. Its powers are not those of OLAF.
Yet its role in intelligence gathering and police cooperation would strengthen
OLAF’s investigative function if the two bodies could liaise closely
Impact of the expansion of the EU on the fight against fraud
The fight against fraud has been dogged by the fragmented response from fifteen
member states. Now that EU membership has increased to twenty seven, this
problem can only be exacerbated. For example, community institutions will have to
cope with twelve new legal systems — this is not likely to improve the current
situation. Efforts have been made to prepare the then candidate countries for their
responsibilities in the fight against fraud. The newly acceded countries have received
financial aid—about three billion euros per year between 2000 and 2004 and before
accession the candidate countries were required to ‘create an efficient anti-fraud
protection system with respect to funds provided in the framework of the Accession
Partnership’ [14]. The accessing countries were obliged to comply their legal
systems with the acquis communautaire as part of their preparation for accession.
EC Regulations such as the Convention on the Protection of the European
Communities Financial Interests and Regulation 2185/96 which covers on the spot
checks and inspections and Regulation No.1073/1999 concerning investigations
conducted by OLAF [16].
OLAF has sought to reinforce its support to Acceding and Candidate countries in
their institutional preparation towards combating fraud against the financial interests
of an enlarged European Union. It has sought to ensure good administrative co-
5 Interview with UCLAF official 1998
6 Interview with Czech Officials 2006
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operation and to encourage and support the capacity of anti-fraud institutions to
prevent and detect fraud and irregularities. By early 2003 twelve countries had
nominated a central (AFCOS) anti-fraud co-ordination structure to act as co-
ordinator for the implementation of legislative, administrative and operational
preparation [5]. Particular attention has been given to training public prosecutors
who will take on responsibility for anti-fraud work and to technical training in the
use of the anti-fraud Information System (AFIS).
The Czech Republic offers an interesting example of the establishment and
operation of the AFCOS structures. Prior to the year 2000, there was no dedicated
structure committed to fighting EU fraud. The aim of the government of the time
was to create a system which not only permitted communication with OLAF
regarding irregularities notification, but also made possible the timely detection of
potentially fraudulent activities and to conduct a thorough investigation through both
criminal and administrative proceedings7. The Supreme Prosecutor’s Office was
appointed to be the single contact point for OLAF in terms of co-operation
concerning the fight against fraud and other illegal activities detrimental to the EU’s
financial interests. The Prosecutor’s Office established contact points for AFCOS
matters in other ministries and institutions such as the Ministries of Agriculture,
Transport, Regional Development and the Police services. Despite the Supreme
Prosecutor’s office being officially the only contact point for OLAF, the individual
ministries responsible for the implementation of EU spending programmes sent their
reports of irregularities directly to OLAF, and the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office was
only provided with information about the nature and timing of the irregularities.
There is scope here for differences in interpretation of what is an irregularity and in
reporting practice. It would be preferable if reporting to OLAF came through the
designated contact point namely, the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office. Yet despite this,
irregularities are reported on time and in the correct formats, this has specifically
been mentioned in OLAF reports [6]. However, fragmentation between member
states and agencies is a major problem for the EU, this can only be exacerbated if it
occurs within new member states like the Czech Republic. There have also been
problems with the attitude of the present Czech Government which “does not favour
co-operation with Brussels”8 This attitude stems from the view of President Klaus of
the Civic Democratic party and cascades downwards through the government, even
to the ordinary person on the street. The question appears to be asked “What real
benefits have we gained from joining the EU?”.
The Czech Republic also did not ratify the PFI Convention and its associated
protocols in time for accession to the EU. The reason for this as detailed by Fenyk
[9] was that neither the Convention or its protocols had been published in the
Official Journal of the EU in the Czech language and the Ministry of Justice was
only engaged in 2004 to draft the official translation of the text of the Convention
and with time taken for both comments by officials of the Czech Supreme
Prosecutors Office as well as external experts, neither the Convention nor the
Protocols were delivered to the Czech Parliament with the proposal for accession to
the EU. The Convention has still not been ratified and the Czech criminal code has
7 Interview with Czech Officials 2006
8 Interview with Czech Officials 2006
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not been amended to ensure full compatibility with the PFI Convention as well as
Article 280 of the EU treaty whereby member states are required to take the same
measures to counter fraud against the Community’s financial interests as they would
to counter fraud against their own financial interests. So, not all member states have
incorporated crimes against the European budget into their legal framework and so
in that sense, we do not have a level playing field. Prospective member staes should
look to the example of the Czech Republic in this area and ensure that a fully
translated and reviewed PFI Convention together with its associated protocols is
delivered to their national parliament with the proposal for accession in order that the
ratification process for the Convention can be completed at the earliest possible
opportunity. The importance of the PFI Convention and its Protocols cannot be
overstated because they are important elements of a common basis for criminal law
protection of the Union’s financial interests, as they deal with aspects of substantive
criminal law and judicial co-operation, and ratification and implementation is a step
towards reducing the fragmentary nature of the legal approaches to fighting fraud
against the EU.
New Member States, like the Czech Republic, are being asked to bring their anti-
fraud structures up to the level and standard of established EU members within a
very short period of time. Their structures are not as developed as those in the
existing member states. They are not as economically developed as existing
members and may not have sufficient financial resources to employ to fund anti-
fraud institutions and structures. The level and pace of economic development may
create incentives to engage in fraud and irregularities. If these difficulties are coupled
with a lack of domestic support and a lack of support from Brussels, the situation
becomes even more problematic.
Why has the EU allowed this situation and state of affairs to continue? There were
strict conditions laid down for amendments to legal systems and for structures such as
AFCOS to be established, yet there have been problems with co-operation and
ratification of the PFI Convention and countries like the Czech Republic were allowed to
accede without such fundamentals being in place. The political imperative of eastern
enlargement was more important than the so-called conditionalities. The desire to secure
access to new markets in Eastern Europe and of generating stability and growth as well
as promoting reform in post-Communist Europe appear to have outweighed the
concerns of anti-fraud officials and academic experts.
Therefore, an enlarged EU can only increase the amount of fragmentation which
already exists. Without a coherent legal space and a fraud squad that has the power
to cross-borders, question suspects, seize documents, search premises and present
evidence according to standardised rules and procedures, then the fight against fraud
will be hampered by legal lacunae which the determined fraudster can exploit.
Tupman [25] believes that citizens of the EU will have to come to accept such
institutions if the threat posed by organised criminality is to be tackled effectively.
Lack of a unified legal space
One of the most fundamental problems facing the European Union’s central
authorities and its member states, is having to fight fraud across twenty seven
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different legal systems within the union itself as well as across many more lying
outside its boundaries. This is so, because fraudsters do not just base themselves
within the European Union [19]. The whole legal process is bedevilled with
difficulties and differences in procedure as well as tradition and jurisprudence.
‘Applicable penalties vary substantially, with Member States only obligated to
ensure that penalties have a deterrent effect’ [28], p.255). An obvious difference
between legal systems, is that which lies between the accusatorial system and the
inquisitorial system. However, systems which superficially look quite similar, can
mask significant variations. However, systems which superficially look quite similar
can mask significant variations: as with many of the inquisitorial systems operating
on mainland Europe. Law enforcement bodies on the whole, have to comply with
procedure and go through ‘the proper channels’: whereas criminals face no such
difficulties. They operate in ‘real time’ and exploit differences in procedure,
protocol, and consequent time delays to their advantage. The fact that the single
market has removed commercial borders but left legal frontiers intact has provided
‘safe havens’ for criminals. Passas & Nelkin [17] reveal how the courts in Italy, one
in the North and one in the South, had great difficulty in co-operating with each
other in a case involving European Union funds.
The response to the lack of a unified legal space has been on an ad hoc basis.
There have been efforts to protect the financial interests of the EU through the
criminal law process, the Convention on the protection of the European
Communities’ financial interests (PFI Convention) has been ratified by member
states although this has taken some years to achieve. It requires that national criminal
definitions should be changed if necessary to ensure compliance with the PFI
convention. Member states are also required to ensure that offences against the
European budget are punished by effective and proportionate penalties which would
allow heads of businesses or people who have the power to take decisions within
business, to be declared liable under the criminal law of the member state in cases
affecting the EU’s financial interests (Official Journal C316, 27.11.1995).
More ambitiously, perhaps, there was an attempt to draft a legal code—the
Corpus Juris proposals which attemped to construct a unified body of rules to deal
with crimes against the European Budget. The proposals included the establishment
of the post of European Public Prosecutor. There was strong opposition, in particular
from the British Government, which regarded the proposals as a surrender of
national sovereignty. Yet, the investigation into the proposals undertaken by the UK
House of Lords European Select Committee, recognised that substantial difficulties
exist in terms of prosecuting frauds on EU funds in national courts. National
criminal laws are essentially territorial in scope; few Member States have laws
specially directed at prosecuting such frauds [10], para.25). Given such difficulties,
then there can be little surprise that more drastic or radical proposals for legal
harmonisation have been considered. The Corpus Juris proposals were however seen
as too radical and different. Perhaps they were too idealistic, however, there is still a
need for some kind of legal “umbrella” to provide a consistency to defining,
investigating and prosecuting fraud.
The response that has been made so far to the lack of a coherent legal framework
was given impetus by the Tampere European Council of October 1999 which
enshrined the principle of mutual recognition as the ‘cornerstone’ of judicial
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cooperation. There have been attempts to establish common definitions for a range
of offences including fraud. There have been attempts to co-ordinate judicial
proceedings—the creation of Eurojust is an example of this. The European Arrest
Warrant which establishes a procedure based on automatic recognition of judicial
orders for arrest made in another Member State, thus replacing the present
extradition arrangements. In dealing with fraudsters who seek to try to exploit
differences in legal systems, then there is obvious potential here to speed up the
judicial process. It is not obvious from OLAF reports as to how much use has been
made of this instrument.
There has also been a proposal made by the Commission in its Green paper on
criminal law protection of the financial interests of the Community to establish the post
of European Public Prosecutor. This would be an independent judicial authority
empowered to conduct investigations and prosecutions anywhere in the EuropeanUnion
into offences against the Union’s financial interests. The House of Lords makes the point
that sensing the strong reactions to these proposals, the Commission stressed that trial
and judgement would remain in the hands of the national courts [11].
The Constitutional Treaty, now of course abandoned, envisaged the EPP being
established from Eurojust which could then be transformed into a prosecution body.
In its evidence to the House of Lords, OLAF believed that it could be envisaged that
it could have criminal investigative powers to assist the European Public Prosecutor.
This could then of course bring OLAF’s relationship with Europol into question. The
House of Lords wondered whether the two bodies could be merged—the EPP would
be in control of the merged body.
These proposals are still undermined by the lack of a unified legal space. If the
law is to have the support of the citizen, it has to be seen to be fair. There would still
be scope in national courts for offences to be treated differently and different
punishments to be handed out. If a centralised body is to have legal competence to
fight fraud against the budget, then this needs to be underpinned by a legal code. The
Corpus Juris was a step forward in terms of adopting a more effective and consistent
approach to tackling EU fraud.
Conclusions
The main conclusions that can be drawn from this discussion are that the fight
against fraud is hampered by the degree of fragmentation which exists. Fragmen-
tation exists at different levels. On one level there is the degree of legal
fragmentation. There is no one legal code or system which exists to protect the
European Budget. At present there are twenty seven separate legal systems. Law
enforcement methods differ from country to country. There are difficulties in
obtaining evidence in one jurisdiction and trying to present it before the courts in
another jurisdiction. Criminals take advantage of the legal loopholes which exist,
and some may base themselves outside of the European Union which complicates
the situation even further. The expansion of the Union has made a difficult situation
somewhat worse.
A second level where fragmentation exists is in the approach to investigation and
control. There are multiple actors involved in the monitoring and investigation of
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fraud across twenty seven Member States: to co-ordinate the activities of these
agencies which face territorial, linguistic, legal and cultural barriers is a mammoth
task. OLAF, the European Fraud Prevention Agency has faced problems in trying to
co-ordinate its activities with a sister agency Eurojust, this does not bode well for a
more widespread co-ordination with multiple Member state agencies.
There is no one agency which owns fraud. OLAF, may be the lead agency, but is
highly dependent on Member State agencies and is also hampered by having a large
number of staff employed on temporary contracts which can lead to a lack of
continuity and new staff facing a steep learning curve in the middle of complex
investigations.
Even in a relatively small and homogeneous country like the Czech Republic, the
problems of fragmentation with a number of agencies involved in the fight against
fraud and difficulties with amending the legal system are seen in microcosm.
Until there is a coherent legal code which supports the activities of a fraud squad
which has the powers of surveillance, arrest and interrogation across the European
Union, which would reduce the degree of fragmentation, then the policing of the
European Union and its budget will be less than effective.
Brendan Quirke is a Senior Lecturer in Accounting & Finance at Liverpool
Business School which is part of Liverpool John Moores University in the UK.
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